First Principles of Reason CANNOT be Irradicated From the Human Mind. Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the ENTIRE Perennial Philosophical Tradition (i.e., philosophy of common sense) Obliterate Chris Ferrara's "Diabolical Disorientation" and all forms of "MenteVacantism."
Chris Ferrara's video on "Diabolical Disorientation" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7wOnZkS5AKQ
|St. Thomas Aquinas -- Summa TheologicaePart II, I, Q. 94 The Natural Law|
| Article 2|
Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?
... As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another." But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in [Aristotle's] Metaphysics. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" [Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination. ...
Article 4. Whether the natural law is the same in all men?
... The natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in [Aristotle's] Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail ...
Article 5. Whether the natural law can be changed?
... A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the Divine law and by human laws.
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles, which, as we have said (Article 4), are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence ...
Post-Vatican II a new Church was founded, it was an antipapal as Calvin, as pro-reform as Luther and as defiant as Henry VIII, "Recognise and Resist". It is unfortunate that so many who looked for the truth fell into this position like billiard balls, with one of the great players being Archbishop Lefebvre himself to the great joy of his deceitful advisors.ReplyDelete
Chris Ferrara says diabolical disorientation is about the suspension of the three laws of thought. But if the laws of thought are suspended, then we can't think rationally. And if we can't think rationally, then we are not responsible for our actions.ReplyDelete
We know that diabolical disorientation is a fabrication. But Chris Ferrara says it's real. This raises a question. The devil would not be able to destroy souls, since they would not be responsible for their sins or crimes. And God would not punish them because they did not will to sin. So, what purpose does Chris Ferrara think diabolical disorientation would serve?
"What purpose does Chris Ferrara think diabolical disorientation would serve?"Delete
If it were possible for the head of the Church and almost all of the bishops to be diabolically disoriented, it would serve to contradict the Church's De fide teaching on the purpose of the Church. "Christ founded the Church in order to continue His work of redemption for all time."
Chris Ferrara's theory raises another question: How could such an intelligent man use the least plausible hypothesis and overlook Pope St. Pius X's famous encyclical, which offers the real explanation for the phenomena? The three laws of thought were never suspended from the Church's hierarchy. There's no such thing as diabolical disorientation in the way Chris Ferrara explains it.
What we are seeing today has a name. It's called MODERNISM.
Even a lawyer like Ferrara cannot diminish the responsibility of the Modernists for their crimes. The crime of heresy incurs excommunication ipso facto, i.e., automatically, without a declaration. Period.
Do you deny that people can be mistaken or disoriented in their apprehension of secondary and tertiary precepts of the natural law? Do you deny that people can be mistaken in their understanding of what is revealed? Do you deny that the evil spirits would have a hand in this?ReplyDelete
Pope St. Pius X could have taken the easy way out and excused all the Modernists of his time as diabolically disoriented and, therefore, not culpable. But he did not. He called the heresy for what it was, the "synthesis of all heresies." He called the Modernists HERETICS.Delete
But of course, appealing to St. Pius X means nothing at all to the Gallicans, because he too they can resist.